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REFORMING AND RESTRUCTURING UKRZALIZNYTSIA:  A 
CRUCIAL TASK FOR UKRAINIAN REFORMERS 
 
Purpose.  This article examines options available for Ukraine as the country considers proposals 
to reform and restructure Ukrzaliznytsia.  Methodology.  The basic restructuring options observed 
internationally are presented, and the literature concerning their impacts and effectiveness is reviewed.  
Findings.  The creation of competition among freight train companies has been found to improve system 
performance, but the EU policy prescription of complete vertical separation may not be required in order to 
achieve this.  The Americas-style policy of horizontal separation has also been found to improve system 
performance, and may be more appropriate for a country as large as Ukraine and a railway as dependent on 
freight operations as Ukrzaliznytsia.  Originality.  Most of the literature on railways restructuring focuses 
on vertical separation or third party access, while the focus here is on a policy option arguably more 
appropriate to Ukraine.  Practical value.  Ukraine’s economy is dependent on the efficient shipment of 
bulk commodities such as coal, iron ore, steel, and grains – commodities that travel most economically over 
long distances by rail.  The successful reform and restructuring of Ukrzaliznytsia will be a crucial part of 
Ukrainian economic reforms going forward. 
 Keywords:  Ukrzaliznytsia, railways, reform, restructuring, vertical separation, horizontal 
separation, competition, investment.
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Introduction 
 
If the Ukrainian economy is to be 
successfully restructured going forward, a 
restructured railway system will have to be 
part of the picture.  Ukraine’s economy 
depends on the production and sale of a 
number of bulk commodities, including 
coal, iron ore, steel, and agricultural 
products, that require shipment by rail in 
order to reach both domestic and export 
markets economically. 
The Ukrainian Railway – 
Ukrzaliznytsia, UZ – was formed as a joint 
stock company in 2015 from what had been 
six separate regional railways, each with a 
good deal of autonomy. UZ suffers from 
aging locomotives and rolling stock as well 
as a badly depreciated infrastructure that 
causes traffic bottlenecks at crucial 
locations.  An important first step in creating 
a viable railway going forward will be to 
find ways to attract investment into the 
system.  Given competing demands on 
government resources, the international 
experience suggests that this will likely have 
to focus on private sector participation.  
Attracting private sector participation, in 
turn, will likely require a restructuring 
strategy that relies on market forces and 
competition rather than government decision 
makers to direct strategy and operations into 
the future. 
In this paper we first discuss in 
more detail the crucial role that UZ plays  in 
the Ukrainian economy.  We follow with a 
survey of the world experience with 
railways restructuring:  a large number of 
countries have already undertaken the task 
of converting aging government-owned 
monopoly railways into more dynamic and 
competitive transport enterprises, and their 
experience in very diverse settings may have 
important lessons to offer.  We then examine 
the current state of rail reform plans in 
Ukraine.  We conclude with discussions of 
an alternative path forward that seems most 
likely to be successful in Ukraine, based on 
both the experience elsewhere and the 
country’s current situation. 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this article is to 
examine the options available for Ukraine as 
the country considers proposals to reform 
and restructure Ukrzaliznytsia. 
 
Methodology 
 
 For this purpose we begin with a 
more detailed discussion of the crucial role 
that Uzrzaliznytsia plays in the economy of 
Ukraine.  We follow with a review of the 
current literature regarding the international 
experience with railway costs and with 
different railway reform models. 
 
Ukrainian Railways and the Ukrainian 
Economy 
 
Ukraine’s economy is based on the 
production of bulk commodities that 
generally travel most economically by rail -- 
especially given the relatively poor 
condition of the country’s road and highway 
system [1, 2, 3, 4].  Ukraine is among the 
top ten world producers of iron ore, steel, 
coking coal, wheat, corn, and sunflower oil. 
 Coal (both utility and coking) is the leading 
commodity carried by rail, making up about 
a fourth of annual volume; steel, iron ore, 
and related products make up another 
quarter; and grains and building materials 
make up a good portion of the rest. 
 Container traffic has a small but growing 
presence, especially as transit traffic.  A 
good deal of the freight traffic originates in 
the east, including coal from the Donbas, 
iron ore and steel from the Kryvbas, and 
import and transit traffic from the Russian 
Federation. 
The railway itself is the fourteenth 
largest in the world in track-km and the sixth 
most densely operated (as measured by ton-
kilometers plus passenger kilometers per 
track-km).  It is a freight-dominant railway, 
carrying the seventh highest total of ton-km 
of freight in the world (and not far behind 
Kazakhstan for sixth place).  On the other 
hand, compared with the railways of other 
medium to large countries, UZ also carry a 
large number of passengers -- around twenty 
percent of traffic, a considerably greater 
percentage than the Russian and Kazakh 
railways, for example.  The combination of 
export traffic and transit traffic makes up 59 
percent of the freight tonnage [5]; a 
significant portion of this has been freight 
originating in Russia and ultimately 
departing from Ukraine either by rail to the 
west (especially to Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, and Hungary) or by sea to the 
south (especially via greater Odessa). 
As noted above, UZ was formed in 
2015 from the six regional railways that had 
survived Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence from the USSR in 1991 , each 
of which had enjoyed a good deal of 
autonomy:  the Donets Railway, the Lviv 
Railway, the Odessa Railway, the Southern 
Railway (Kharkiv), the Southwestern 
Railway (Kyiv), and the Near-Dnipro 
Railway (Dnipropetrovsk).  (See Map 1.)  
The Donets, Near-Dnipro, and Odessa had 
traditionally been the most heavily used and 
the most important for freight, given their 
locations centered on coal mining (Donets), 
iron ore and steel production (Near-Dnipro), 
and port activities (Odessa).  Before the 
formation of JSC UZ in 2014, both 
international lenders and local reformers had 
expressed frustration at the inability of the 
central government and/or railway 
administration to impose more effective 
centralized control on these regional lines. 
UZ freight tariffs are set on the same 
basis that was used when the Ukrainian 
railways were a part of Soviet Railways:  on 
the old tariff book Tariff 10-01.  As in 
Russia, Tariff 10-01 separates freight tariffs 
into three broad classes of commodities that 
may be roughly categorized as raw 
materials, intermediate goods, and final 
products: 
• Class I commodities include coal, 
ores, timber, and construction 
materials such as sand, stone, and 
concrete. 
• Class II includes oil, grain, 
fertilizers, food, and a broad 
collection of intermediate goods. 
• Class III contains finished chemicals 
and metals, machinery, and most 
finished manufactured goods. 
Individual tariffs in each category are then 
determined using a declining scale for 
distance of haul and adjusting for shipment 
size and charges for loading and unloading. 
The overall rationale behind the tariff 
structure is basically twofold: to encourage 
long-distance shipments at affordable rates, 
and to charge for shipping each commodity 
no more than a target percentage of its 
delivered price [6, 7]. 
Like many railways around the 
world, UZ is required to cross-subsidize 
loss-making passenger operations from the 
profits of its freight operations [8].  Also 
like many railways around the world, this 
requirement to cross-subsidize passenger 
operations has made it more difficult for the 
railway to devote sufficient resources to the 
maintenance of current equipment and the 
acquisition of new equipment [9].  Worse, 
weak corporate governance at UZ has led to 
a procurement system characterized by low 
quality inputs purchased at high cost  [10].  
Even more importantly, large, politically 
influential shippers pay preferential tariffs 
that at best cover only direct costs  [11, 12]. 
 The result is that the locomotive and rolling 
stock parks are heavily depreciated and 
generally in poor operating condition; 
likewise, the track infrastructure is heavily 
depreciated and exhibits costly bottlenecks 
in several regions of the country [13, 14, 
15].  A high priority going forward will be a 
reform plan that is able to attract large flows 
of investment into infrastructure, 
locomotives, and rolling stock [9, 16, 17]. 
The World Experience with Railways 
Restructuring 
 
The decades of the 1990’s and the 
2000’s were everywhere periods of 
neoliberal reform and privatization strategies 
in general and in the railways sector in 
particular [18].  As in other infrastructure 
sectors, railways reforms around the world 
have tended to focus both on the 
introduction of private-sector participation 
and on the possibilities for the creation of 
competition in the context of what has been 
traditionally considered a natural monopoly.  
Also as in other infrastructure sectors, 
economists around the world have tended to 
favor the structural separation of going 
concerns as a sort of default option – as the 
generally preferred method of restructuring 
to create competition among users of a 
network.  It has only been recently that 
much scholarly attention has been paid to 
the potentially negative cost implications of 
this policy in industries as diverse as 
railways, electricity, telecommunications, 
and water [19, 20, 21, 22].  
A great deal of the policy debate 
regarding railways restructuring has 
concerned the possible creation of 
competition among multiple train-operating 
companies over a monopoly track 
infrastructure.  With this possibility has 
come the question of whether such 
competition would be more effective in the 
presence of complete “vertical separation” 
between infrastructure and train operations, 
or whether a less drastic “third party access” 
regime – under which the incumbent UZ 
would remain vertically integrated but 
would be required to provide infrastructure 
access to independent train-operating 
companies under regulated terms and 
conditions – would be sufficient to support 
the introduction of competition, perhaps 
accompanied by some kind of “accounting 
separation” of the incumbent with the 
creation of an overall holding company.  
Although Britain’s pioneering experience 
with complete vertical separation is 
generally considered a cautionary tale, the 
competition directorate of the European 
Community continues to push member 
countries in that direction.   
As an alternative, minority voices in 
the debate have called for the creation of 
competition among multiple vertically 
integrated railway enterprises – a strategy 
sometimes termed “horizontal separation” to 
contrast it with “vertical separation” [17, 
20].  Under such a strategy, each railway 
enterprise runs trains on only the 
infrastructure that it controls, but shippers 
hope to enjoy either “parallel competition” – 
competing railway lines serving the same 
origin-destination pairs, as is common in the 
United States and Canada – or “geographic 
competition” – competing railway lines 
radiating out from common points, as in 
Mexico and Argentina.  Map 2 shows a 
stylized version of the Mexican railway 
system as it was restructured in the 1990’s, 
with three vertically integrated companies 
competing mostly to carry freight in 
multiple directions between Mexico City 
and different ports and US gateways. 
One notably successful aspect of the 
implementation of the horizontal separation 
model has been the attraction of private 
investments into these rail systems, initially 
in the form of bids for multi-decade 
franchise rights, and subsequently in the 
form of investments in to the infrastructure, 
locomotives, and rolling stock of the newly 
created vertically integrated railways.  In 
both Brazil and Mexico, for example, the 
governments required the controlling rights 
of each franchise to be held by domestic 
investors, but encouraged the participation 
of international investors.  Table 1 shows the 
winning bids for the franchise rights that 
resulted from the franchising in the two 
countries and the lengths of the principal 
railways.  I calculate that the ten franchised 
freight railways average just over 4000 
track-km in length, and that the average 
winning bid was US$95,700 per track-km, 
in late 1990’s US$.   
Furthermore, in the fifteen years 
following the restructuring in Mexico, 
private investments into the system totaled 
over US$6 billion – more than double the 
amount required and pledged by the 
consortia that won the [23]. 
As the railways reform debate has 
progressed and different options have been 
pursued in different countries, there come to 
be greater appreciation of the possibility that 
different reform strategies might be 
appropriate in different countries and 
environments.  There has in many cases also 
come to be a differentiation in the strategic 
options pursued for freight and passenger 
operations [24]. 
Britain is a good example.  As 
mentioned, that country has been one of the 
pioneers in the creation of competition in 
railways.  Originally the focus was on 
complete vertical separation and the creation 
of competition among multiple independent 
train-operating companies in both the freight 
and passenger areas.  However, eventually it 
came to be widely believed that in an era of 
both widespread automobile ownership and 
discount airlines, passenger rail was 
dependent on government subsidies simply 
to survive.  In that case on-track passenger 
rail competition was not sustainable, and the 
focus of policy moved to the creation of 
competition for monopoly franchises to 
control particular regional passenger rail 
operations in the tradition of Chadwick [25] 
and Demsetz [26]. 
On the other hand, on the freight side 
the introduction of on-track competition has 
led to vigorous duopoly competition 
between the old English, Welsh, and 
Scottish Railway (EWS, now a subsidiary of 
the German rail freight company DB 
Schenker) and Freightliner [27].  More 
generally, around the world, freight-
dominant railway systems pay their own 
way without large-scale government 
subsidies, and in fact generally earn profits, 
pay taxes, and cross-subsidize passenger 
operations.   
Empirical efforts to evaluate 
systematically the outcomes of the recent 
spate of railways reforms around the world, 
and especially to isolate the relative 
performance of different reform models, 
have been hampered by problems of data 
availability and quality, the short time 
period involved since reforms have been 
implemented, differences among railways 
sectors in different countries, and the 
possible endogeneity of reforms – both the 
reform decision itself and the reform path 
chosen.  The best and most recent studies 
suggest that most reform efforts have led to 
improved efficiency, though in addition to 
possible endogeneity one possible 
explanation here is simply that increased 
attention to industry structure and efficiency 
by itself leads to improvements.  Among the 
more specific findings: 
•   Where competition has been 
created among multiple train-
operating companies (TOC’s) – so-
called “above-the-rail” competition 
– for passenger operations, the 
European experience suggests that 
generally fares have been reduced 
and services have improved, but 
costs have increased, presumably 
reflecting the sacrifice of firm-
level economies of density of 
operations [27, 28, 29]. 
•   Where competition has been 
created above-the-rail for freight, 
the European experience has been 
more conspicuously successful, 
with incumbents in several 
countries rapidly losing market 
share to more nimble entrants [30, 
31, 32]. 
• In general, reforms that have 
allowed additional TOC’s to use 
the infrastructure have been found 
to increase operational efficiency 
as measured by data envelope 
analysis and stochastic production 
frontiers [33, 34, 35].  However, it 
is not at all certain that complete 
vertical separation is more 
conducive to the introduction of 
competition or to increased 
efficiency than is a third party 
access model, perhaps structured 
around accounting separation of 
the incumbent [33, 36]. 
• The alternative strategy of 
horizontal separation of freight 
railways – the creation of multiple 
competing vertically integrated 
freight railways – has in several 
cases succeeded in attracting a 
great deal of private investment 
into previously moribund state 
operated railways and diverted 
significant levels of traffic from 
road back to rail, to the benefit of 
shippers, the broader economy, and 
the environment [23, 37, 38, 39, 
40]. 
• The vertical separation and third-
party access models have mostly 
been applied in small-to-medium 
sized countries in Europe where 
passenger operations dominate the 
railways business.  The horizontal 
separation model has mostly been 
applied in larger countries in the 
Americas where freight operations 
dominate the railways business – 
though some smaller Latin 
American countries have followed 
this strategy as well, including 
Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay [20, 
39]. 
Of course any discussion of the 
restructuring of existing railway enterprises 
raises the issue of the structure of railway 
costs.  This is an issue that has been much 
examined in the empirical literature, though 
there are inevitably differences in results 
based on samples, assumptions, and 
techniques.  We may summarize the 
discussion regarding three important aspects 
of railway cost functions as follows: 
•   It seems by now well established 
that there are economies of vertical 
integration in railways, and thus 
that complete vertical separation 
increases transactions costs and 
operating costs -- though the 
magnitude of increase is very much 
in dispute.  Vertical separation 
seems to increase costs more than 
otherwise a) in rail systems that are 
very densely operated, and b) in 
rail systems with a high proportion 
of freight traffic vis-à-vis 
passenger [24, 36].  The former 
likely reflects straightforward 
advantages of intrafirm rather than 
intrafirm coordination of 
operations, while the latter likely 
reflects the greater track wear 
caused by heavy freight trains, and 
the difficulty of getting the 
interfirm incentives set just right to 
address that problem [41]. 
• Economies of scale, as measured by 
system size, seem to be exhausted 
at relatively moderate scales of 
operation.  Savignat and Nash [42] 
report a consensus in the literature 
that only relatively small railways 
operate at a level of unexhausted 
economies of system size, and 
Wilson [43] finds that at the mean 
of his sample, US class I railways 
are operating with slight 
diseconomies of system size.  The 
results of Bitzan [44] suggest a 
flattening of the cost curve for 
system size at around 5000 miles, 
while Chapin and Schmidt [45] 
also find a flattening of the cost 
curve, but at about twice that 
mileage level.  More recently, 
Christensen Associates [46] 
conclude that all the major U.S. 
railways are operating in a range of 
constant returns to scale, and have 
been for many years.  Note that the 
average size of the concessions 
granted in Brazil and Mexico was 
in the 4000-4500 track-km range 
(Table 1). 
• It appears, on the other hand, that 
economies of scale as measured by 
density of operations persist in 
more railway settings.  
Econometric studies have generally 
found that most existing freight 
railways are operating at levels 
where economies of density are not 
yet exhausted; this is the 
conclusion of a review of the 
literature by Savignat and Nash 
[42] and of studies of US class I 
railways by Wilson [43], Ivaldi and 
McCullough [47], and Bitzan [44].  
Only recently has Christensen 
Associates [46] concluded that the 
major U.S. railways have likely 
exhausted all available economies 
of density, which is consistent with 
widespread reports of congestion 
and the difficulty of securing 
service on the major lines. 
 
Findings 
 
Ukraine by now has a long history 
of announced plans for restructuring the 
Ukrainian Railways, but unfortunately very 
little record of actually implementing 
changes [48].  Governments introduced 
detailed reform plans in 2006, then again in 
2009, and then again in 2011, with the 2011 
plan looking very much like the Russian 
plan:  three stages of reforms, beginning 
with the creation of a single joint stock 
company Ukrzaliznytsia and the separation 
of the operating and regulatory functions of 
the existing railways, moving through the 
spin-off of noncore activities, the 
elimination of the requirement that freight 
operations cross-subsidize passenger 
operations, and the freeing of tariffs for 
goods enjoying a “competitive transport 
market”, and concluding by 2019 with a 
system of “equal access to the infrastructure 
facilities for all economic entities”.  Thus far 
the creation of JSC UZ has been the only 
significant result of the reform plans. 
Since there were apparently no 
plans in Ukraine (again as in Russia) to 
separate control of the incumbent 
infrastructure from the incumbent 
locomotives and train operation, the broad 
plan just described sounded like it might 
refer to an eventual third party access 
regime, with independent carriers owning 
their own locomotives and running their 
own trains over the UZ infrastructure.  In 
fact, however, in both Ukraine and Russia 
one stated goal of the reforms was to allow 
privately owned and operated passenger 
trains, but not – or at least not mentioned – 
freight trains [49].   
All this changed in 2015, as the 
Infrastructure Ministry under Andriy 
Pyvovarsky introduced legislation, enacted 
by the Rada, that would “corporatize” but 
not “privatize” JSC UZ while allowing entry 
into the market by independent train 
operating companies carrying either 
passengers or freight.  UZ as the 
infrastructure operator would be required to 
provide non-discriminatory access to the 
infrastructure under a regulated set of tariffs, 
which would be monitored and regulated by 
a National Commission on Transport 
Regulation.  That new commission would 
also regulate some passenger and freight 
tariffs, but others would be freed.  An 
infrastructure maintenance and investment 
fund would be created through a specified 
component of both shipper tariffs and access 
charges.   
In other words, Ukraine has taken 
the first steps toward emulating the 
European rail restructuring model of third-
party access (though not full vertical 
separation) regimes for both passenger and 
freight, with UZ continuing to operate its 
own trains in competition with independent 
TOC’s. 
This reform model clearly has the 
potential to stimulate significant 
improvements vis-à-vis the UZ status quo. 
 As noted above, third-party, independent 
freight TOC’s have offered quite effective 
competition to incumbent, vertically 
integrated TOC’s in a number of European 
countries -- beginning in the east in Poland 
and Romania, but gradually moving west, 
especially as German incumbent DB and 
French incumbent SNCF have begun 
offering services in other countries. 
 Particularly in Eastern Europe, some of the 
new TOC’s entering into freight service 
have been large shippers of bulk freight 
integrating backward into transport 
operations in order to create alternatives for 
shipping both their inputs and their outputs. 
 The result has been new investments not 
only in rolling stock but also in locomotives, 
as well as increased options and improved 
service for shippers, thus strongly 
supporting economic growth. 
It seems likely that a number of 
large Ukrainian shippers would be 
candidates for backward vertical integration 
into TOC’s in order to improve the quality 
of their own logistics (or to obtain better 
service from UZ by threatening to do so), 
including the agribusinesses Kernel and 
Nibulon and coal miner and electricity 
generator DTEK.  Similarly, based on their 
past and current strategies, one would expect 
not only Germany’s DB and France’s SNCF 
but also Poland’s PKP and, in a hoped-for 
peaceful future, Russia’s RZhD to be 
interested in extending their train operations 
into Ukraine, if given the opportunity. 
The appearance of independent 
passenger TOC’s seems less likely, though 
certainly not impossible.  As noted above, in 
most countries passenger rail services would 
not survive without subsidies from either 
governments or freight operations, so the 
likelihood of the entry of a second passenger 
TOC into the market to offer competition to 
a (presumably government-subsidized) UZ 
passenger TOC seems not high.  An 
exception might be at the high end of the 
market; in Russia, for example, two high 
quality TOC’s have entered the popular 
Moscow-St. Petersburg market to offer high 
end service at unregulated rates [50, 51]. 
What about resources for investment 
into the infrastructure?  This is where the 
international experience with the third party 
access reform model has been less 
conspicuously successful.  As noted above, 
the Ukrainian plan calls for the formation 
and segregation of an investment fund that 
would be financed through a specified 
component of both shipper tariffs and access 
charges.  If this mechanism works as 
intended, it could solve the common 
problem of the difficulty of funding state-
owned railway infrastructure.  However, 
based on worldwide experience, one may 
justifiably harbor doubts that both UZ 
management and the government will be 
able to show the discipline to use such a 
(potentially) large pot of funds for their 
intended purposes only [9, 20]. 
A sober prediction may be that the 
current Ukrainian reform plan may be quite 
successful in encouraging private investment 
in rolling stock and locomotives and in 
creating competition for freight railroad 
haulage and perhaps even passenger railroad 
service, but ultimately a disappointment in 
encouraging and protecting the 
infrastructure investments required for the 
successful operation of a modern, heavily 
used freight railway.  Since, as noted at the 
beginning of this paper, this issue is likely to 
be a crucial one for the future effectiveness 
of UZ in contributing to Ukrainian economic 
reform and growth, this may be a serious 
drawback to the adoption of this reform 
model in Ukraine. 
And this in turn may argue for 
consideration of an alternative reform plan:  
a Mexican-style division of the entire UZ 
enterprise into two or three independent, 
vertically integrated railway companies, 
competing for the business of shippers 
mostly at points commonly served but 
perhaps over some parallel lines as well.  
This option has been seriously discussed, 
though so far rejected, as a reform plan for 
RZhD in Russia [52], and it would appear to 
hold a number of attractions for Ukraine as 
well – though a number of complications as 
well.  Map 3 shows one published version of 
a Russian scenario. 
The main advantages of such a plan 
are straightforward to list:  the creation of 
competition for shippers, the maintaining of 
economies of vertical integration, and the 
likely willingness of private investors to 
offer significant bids for long-term franchise 
fees and, upon winning a franchise, to invest 
significant amounts into the maintenance 
and upgrading of their new railway 
infrastructures.  As noted above, for the 10 
railways franchised in the late 1990’s in 
Brazil and Mexico, the winning bid was 
almost US$100,000 per track-km.  The 
International Transport Forum calculates 
that just under 50 percent of the substantial 
investments made by the two largest 
Mexican concessionaires between 2007 and 
2012 were allocated to track infrastructure – 
about US$1 billion total over that six-year 
period [53]. 
The most important points for 
originating traffic on UZ are the coal mining 
areas around Donetsk in the east and the iron 
ore and steel making areas around 
Dnipropetrovsk and Kryvyi Rih in the 
center-east.  The port area around Odessa 
both originates and terminates a good deal 
of Black Sea freight.  Generally, the heaviest 
freight flows go (or have gone until 
recently) directly between the Russian 
border, through the Donbas and the 
Kryvbas, and either to the Odessa port area 
in the south, to Kyiv in the center north, or 
to the western border crossings with 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Poland. 
Thus in the same way that both 
published scenarios for horizontal separation 
in the Russian railways begin with the 
notion of geographic competition based on 
multiple railways serving the coal-producing 
Kuzbas from different directions [52, 54], a 
promising basis for horizontal competition 
in the Ukrainian railways in a hoped-for 
peaceful future could be the creation of an 
east-facing railway connecting shippers 
originating coal, iron ore, and/or steel 
products with border crossings of the 
Russian Federation.  RZhD would likely be 
one of several bidders for the franchise 
rights for this “Eastern Ukrainian Railway”. 
At the western termination points of 
this Eastern Ukrainian Railway, the track 
infrastructure serving multiple shippers 
could be jointly controlled – as it is in 
Mexico – by the railway companies 
competing to carry freight in both directions 
as well as either the regional or federal 
government and/or the most important 
shippers themselves.  From those points at 
the western termination of the Eastern 
Ukrainian Railway, either one or two 
additional railway enterprises could be 
created.  The map below adds two 
independent railways heading west from the 
coal and steel regions, with shippers at 
Kharkiv enjoying geographic competition 
from three railways heading in three 
different directions, shippers at Kyiv, 
Odessa, and points in the Donbas and 
Kryvbas served by two railways, and both 
eastern and western borders served as well 
by two railways.  Both large domestic 
shippers and foreign railway companies like 
Deutsche Bahn, PKP, and SNCF are 
potential bidders for the long-term franchise 
rights to such railways [55]. 
Obviously, however, much more 
work would have to be done to actually craft 
three (for example) potentially coherent 
railway enterprises from the overall national 
network. 
 
Originality and Practical Value 
 
For now, at least, Ukraine labors 
under the significant burden of active 
hostilities in its eastern region at the same 
time as politicians, activists, and analysts 
work to create and implement economic 
reforms that would successfully create a 
dynamic and productive market economy.  
At a time when even the overall outlines of 
the future Ukrainian economy are uncertain, 
the railways are not at the top of many lists 
for attention.  Yet Ukraine’s economy of 
resource extraction, heavy industry, and 
agriculture promises to be dependent the 
existence of a reliable railway system for 
quite a long time, and a successful effort to 
get railway reforms right would be an 
important step in that direction. 
To date, the European experience 
with vertical separation and third-party 
access regimes has appeared to enjoy 
considerably greater influence in the 
Ukrainian railways reform debates (and the 
Russian, and the Kazakh) than has the North 
and South American experience with 
horizontal separation.  This is probably 
unfortunate, since the size of the country as 
well as the dominance of freight in its 
railway operations arguably makes the latter 
experience more directly applicable, and 
more likely to be adaptable in a 
straightforward manner to the Ukrainian 
context.  In particular, if the country 
continues along the basic path of the 
European railways reform agenda, it is 
likely to achieve the same results:  increased 
private investment in rolling stock, but 
continued dependence on the unreliable state 
budget for funding for both locomotives and 
infrastructure. 
I have argued here that the North 
and South American experience suggests 
that a country like Ukraine could use the 
horizontal separation strategy to carve two 
or three independent, vertically integrated 
freight railways from the existing system, 
railways of a size that has been shown to be 
viable in Brazil and Mexico, and that in a 
hoped-for peaceful future, international 
investors would likely be willing to bid large 
amounts for control rights to railway 
franchises so created as well as to then 
spend large amounts of their own capital to 
upgrade the competing regional railways.  I 
have argued that the principal advantages of 
such a reform strategy are the creation of rail 
competition at multiple locations, the 
preservation of economies of vertical 
integration, and the likely elimination of the 
need for the Ukrainian railways to remain in 
the lengthy queue for government resources 
to upgrade and maintain the rolling stock, 
locomotives, and infrastructure. 
Whether such a scenario is in fact 
the optimal path for the Ukrainian railways 
going forward is a question that clearly 
merits much deeper examination.  The 
stakes at issue suggest that a simple decision 
to follow the previously adopted Russian-
style reform plan may lock out the potential 
for much more promising options, and for a 
more dynamic and vibrant railway to 
support Ukrainian economic growth. 
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